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Abstract 
This paper discusses the relevance of Georg Lukács’ 1923 book History and Class 
Consciousness in the context of digital capitalism. It does so by analysing how Lukács’ 
concepts of the dialectic of subject and object, ideology, reification, reified 
consciousness matter today in the context of big data and digital capitalism. The essay 
shows that History and Class Consciousness’ critique of reification, ideology, and reified 
consciousness remains highly topical in the age of digital capitalism and big data. 
Lukács’ analysis allows us to critically analyse how social media, big data, and various 
other Internet technologies are used as tools of reification. At the same time, Lukács 
reminds us that only human praxis can establish alternatives. 
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This essay asks: What elements of Georg Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness 
can inform the foundations of a critical theory of communication in the age of digital 
capitalism? To provide an answer, the article proceeds in the following manner: Section 
2 analyses ideology and reified consciousness. Section 3 draws attention to the 
relationship of journalism and reification. Section 4 discusses the reification of 
communication technologies. Some conclusions are drawn in section 5. Based on a 
reading of Lukács, the paper wants to show Lukács’ analysis can be used for critically 
analysing contemporary forms of digital communication. 
Rüdiger Dannemann (2017) argues that we today “require an updating of Lukács’ 
phenomenology of reification” in “our brave new digital world” that considers 
contemporary reification’s “peculiar rationality and irrationality”, “technical dimensions 
and human particularity”. The essay at hand understands itself as a contribution to this 
task. 
 




Reification is HCC’s key category. With it, Lukács describes and analyses capitalism’s 
structural effects on human subjectivity and especially consciousness. The notion of 
reification derives from Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism.  
 “The essence of commodity-structure” is that “a relation between people takes on 
the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that 
seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental 
nature: the relation between people” (Lukács, 1971, p. 83; henceforth referred to as 
HCC). Lukács here refers to a passage in Marx’s Capital Volume 1 (chapter 1, section 
1.1), where Marx describes commodities as having a “phantom-like objectivity” (Marx, 
1867, p. 128). With the metaphor of the commodity as ghost, Marx expresses that the 
commodity’s value appears in the money form and the commodity’s price, but its 
substance – the average labour-time that workers have to expend in class relations for 
the production of the commodity – remains hidden.  
Lukács’ notion of reification and Marx’s concept of alienation have in recent debates 
featured prominently within philosophy and critical social theory. For example, Rosa 
(2013) interprets acceleration as a process of alienation. Jaeggi (2014) argues that 
reification means that human subjects are prevented from appropriating the world and 
the self. Axel Honneth (2007) is one of the critical theorists who has in recent times 
worked most directly on actualising Lukács’ concept of reification. He argues that 
reification means society’s disrespect and lack of giving recognition to human beings. 
Building on Lukács and Honneth, Fuchs (2020) has identified exploitation, political 
oppression, and ideology as economic, political and cultural forms of oppression. This 
argument is in line with recent works by David Harvey (2018), who points out that 
alienation is a universal process that takes not just place in class relations but in many 
realms of society. Taken together, these authors show that reification means humans 
face conditions under which they cannot control these conditions, humans’ and society’s 
potentials cannot be realised, and where certain groups instrumentalise others in order 
to realise partial interests. This understanding of reification is in line with Lukács’ outline 
of reification in HCC. His theory remains an important point of reference in 21ast 
century critical theories of society.   
 
Ideology as reified class consciousness 
 
Class consciousness is “the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ [zugerechnet] 
to a particular typical position in the process of production” (HCC, p. 51). 
Imputed/ascribed/attributed class consciousness (zugerechnetes Klassenbewußtsein) is 
objective class consciousness (HCC, p. 323). Objective class consciousness is defined 
by the subject’s role in the production process, it is not simply empirical consciousness, 
but an “objective possibility” of consciousness – the “thoughts and feelings which men 
would have in a particular situation if they were able to assess both it and the interests 
arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society” 
(HCC, p. 51). False consciousness is consciousness that “by-passes the essence of the 
evolution of society and fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately” (HCC, p. 50). 
Ideology has in capitalist society a double nature:  
1) Capitalism has an inherently fetishist character because producers and consumers 
do not experience the entire social relations and process of commodity production in its 
totality so that the thing-status of the commodity and money hides the underpinning 
class relations and makes capitalism appear as a natural and infinite systems without 
alternatives.  
2) Naturalisation is an important feature of ideologies in general, an important 
ideological strategy that makes domination appear necessary, timeless, inevitable and 
infinite in order to justify and legitimate oppression. For Lukács, ideology is a necessary 
legitimating feature of capitalism. The “veil drawn over the nature of bourgeois society is 
indispensable to the bourgeoisie itself. […] the need to deceive the other classes and to 
ensure that their class consciousness remain amorphous is inescapable for a bourgeois 
regime” (HCC, p. 66). 
Just like there is the labour of producing ideology conducted by managers, 
consultants, bourgeois scientists, intellectuals and journalists, etc., there is the ideology 
of labour: According to Lukács, the ideology of Calvinism is constitutive for “bourgeois 
reified consciousness with its things-in-themselves in a mythologised but yet quite pure 
state” (HCC, p. 192). 
Ideology partly operates with the reification of language. Lukács quotes Marx from 
the German Ideology and remarks in a footnote: “Marx goes on to make a number of 
very fine observations about the effects of reification on language. A philological study 
from the standpoint of historical materialism could profitably begin here” (HCC, p. 209, 
footnote 16). Marx argues in the passage mentioned by Lukács that capitalism’s 
“relations of buying and selling” penetrate and shape language: “For example, propriété 
– property [Eigentum] and characteristic feature [Eigenschaft]; property – possession 
[Eigentum] and peculiarity [Eigentümlichkeit]; ‘eigen’ [‘one's own’] – in the commercial 
and in the individual sense; valeur, value, Wert; commerce, Verkehr; échange, 
exchange, Austausch, etc., all of which are used both for commercial relations and for 
characteristic features and mutual relations of individuals as such” (Marx & Engels, 
1845/46, p. 231). Reified society also brings about reified language. Indicative of this 
phenomenon is the presence of reified language in the Oxford Dictionary: For example, 
it defines communication as the “imparting or exchanging of information by speaking, 
writing, or using some other medium”1. Exchange is a social relation, in a specific 
amount of a commodity is exchanged for a particular amount of another commodity: x 
commodity A = y commodity B (Marx, 1867, p. 163). In communication, you do not 
expect an “exchange” of 10 words for 10 words. Indeed, one person might utter a 
sentence consisting of ten words and another person might answer with just one word 
or a sentence consisting of twenty words. Language is in general not a commodity, 
although its objectifications can be turned into commodities, as the case of a book that 
is sold for a particular amount of money shows. The example shows that the commodity 
form in capitalism not just reifies social relations, but as part of reified social relations 
also reifies communication and language that mediate the production and reproduction 
of social relations. 
In the English language, “exchange” stems from the Latin word excambiāre, the 
Anglo-Norman word eschanger, and the Old French verb eschangier2. During the rise of 
Mercantilism in the 16th century, “exchange” was established as common word for the 
“[p]ractice of merchants or lenders meeting to exchange bill of debt” and “building for 
mercantile business”3. Fetishism makes the particular appear as general. 
Communication is a general feature of all societies, whereas exchange only exists in 
societies shaped by class, markets, and divisions of labour. The linguistic conflation of 
exchange as commodity trade and exchange as communication creates the impression 
that markets are a general necessary feature of all societies. As a consequence of 
capitalist fetishism’s impact on language, the Oxford Dictionary defines exchange 
simultaneously as a “short conversation or an argument” and “the trading of a particular 
commodity or commodities”, a “system or market in which commercial transactions 
involving currency, shares, etc. can be carried out”, and the “changing of money to its 
equivalent in the currency of another country”4. 
Lukács wrote History and Class Consciousness longest chapter “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat” in 1923. Given that the Nazis had not-yet come to 
power and just five years had passed since the Russian Revolution, Lukács was at this 
point of time rather optimistic about the potentials of proletarian revolutions. He argues 
that the bourgeoisie has necessary false consciousness, whereas the proletariat does 
not automatically have revolutionary consciousness, but has the possibility to see 
through fetishism. Lukács’ political optimism is for example present in formulations such 
as the ones that the “consciousness of the proletariat is still fettered by reification” 
(HCC, p. 76) or capitalism keeps “the bourgeoisie imprisoned within this immediacy 
while forcing the proletariat to go beyond it” (HCC, p. 164).  
In the immediate years after the Russian Revolution, optimistic assessments of the 
proletariat’s actuality were certainly more justified than in the years between 1933 and 
1945 or today. But HCC overall avoids overstressing the actuality of the proletariat’s 
revolutionary consciousness and puts more stress on the proletariat’s reified 
consciousness. Lukács therefore speaks of an “ideological crisis of the proletariat in 
which proletarian ideology lags behind the economic crisis” (HCC, p.305). Reification is 
“the necessary, immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society” (HCC, p. 
197). “The danger to which the proletariat has been exposed since its appearance on 
the historical stage was that it might remain imprisoned in its immediacy together with 
the bourgeoisie” (HCC, p. 196). The proletariat can fail “to take this step” of becoming 
“the identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality”. Capitalism 
constitutes at the same time potentials for the “quantitative increase of the forms of 
reification” and the “undermining of the forms of reification” (HCC, p. 208). 
Revolutionary consciousness is no automatism, the proletariat “can be transformed and 
liberated only by its own actions” (HCC, p. 208). “History is at its least automatic when it 
is the consciousness of the proletariat that is at issue” (HCC, p. 208). “Above all the 
worker can only become conscious of his existence in society when he becomes aware 
of himself as a commodity” (HCC, p. 168). 
Lukács argues that there are three sources of the “bourgeoisification of the 
proletariat” (HCC, p. 310, Verbürgerlichung in the German original): the emergence of 
privileged sections of the working class (HCC, p. 304-305), the effects of capitalism’s 
structures of reification on consciousness (HCC, p. 310), and the taming influence of 
reformist social democratic parties and unions. Revisionist social democracy is an 
ideology with which “the proletariat falls victim to all the antinomies of reification” (HCC, 
p. 197). For Lukács, the communist party plays an important role in the development of 
proletarian class consciousness. “The struggle of the Communist Party is focused upon 
the class consciousness of the proletariat” (HCC, p. 326). 
 
Right-wing authoritarianism and new nationalisms online: Reified consciousness on the 
Internet 
 
Since the new world economic crisis started in 2008, the predominant reaction has not 
been the strengthening of the political left, but the rise of new nationalisms and right-
wing authoritarianism (Fuchs, 2018a). In many parts of the world, far-right, nationalist 
ideology finds crucial support among blue-collar workers. Morgan and Lee analysed the 
relation of voting behaviour and the occupational structure in the USA’s 1,142 
geographical units (defined by the American Community Survey). The working class 
was in this analysis defined as consisting of lower-grade service workers, skilled manual 
workers, unskilled manual workers, farmers, agricultural worker, and individuals without 
occupation whose highest educational attainment is a high school diploma. The analysis 
found that “Trump’s gains in 2016, relative to Romney’s more generic performance as a 
near-loss Republican candidate in 2012, were most substantial in areas with the largest 
percentages of eligible voters who can be identified as members of the white working 
class” (Morgan & Lee, 2018, p. 239). “A complementary areal analysis of 1,142 
geographic units shows that Trump’s gains in 2016 above Romney’s performance in 
2012 are strongly related to the proportions of the voting population in each geographic 
unit that were white and working class. This strong relationship holds in the six states 
that Trump flipped, and it varies little across other types of states. […] the results […] of 
our analysis support the claim that Trump’s appeal to the white working class was 
crucial to his victory” (Morgan & Lee, 2018, p. 240). 
Similar developments of far-right, nationalist politicians and parties succeeding in 
elections can be found in many countries. In many cases, blue-collar workers strongly 
support these type of politics (see Fuchs, 2018a), which is an indication that since 2008, 
there has been an intensification and extension of the tendency that nationalist ideology 
reifies blue-collar workers consciousness: A significant share of this part of the working 
class succumbs to the ideology that not class relations and capitalism, but immigrants, 
refugees and other nations are the cause of inequality and social problems. Nationalist 
and racist ideology presents a constructed conflict between nations and constructed 
conflicts between cultures as stratifying divisions in order to distract attention from the 
class conflict between capital and labour that has in the past decades resulted in rising 
profit and capital shares (the share of profits and capital in the gross domestic product) 
at the expense of the wage share (the share of wages in the gross domestic product) 
(Fuchs 2018a).  
Social media such as Facebook and Twitter are key communication tools of 
contemporary right-wing politics. In the past couple of years, analyses of the right-wing 
use of the Internet have become more important (see e.g. Ernst et al., 2017; Müller & 
Schulz, 2019; Stier et al., 2017), which is a consequence of the global proliferation of 
what Lukács termed reified consciousness. Nationalists communicate four aspects of 
right-wing authoritarianism over online media: top-down leadership, nationalism, the 
friend/enemy-scheme, and the need for militant measures against the constructed 
enemies (Fuchs, 2018a). 
Let us have a look at an example:  Breitbart is a far-right online news portal that 
frequently features nationalist propaganda and has supported Donald Trump. Its former 
executive chairman Steven Bannon was the chief executive officer of Trump’s 
presidential campaign and the Trump-executive’s White House Chief Strategist from 
January until August 2017. But the relations between Trump and Breitbart are older 
than that. On July 11, 2014, Breitbart published an article by Trump titled “A Country 
That Cannot Protect its Borders Will Not Last”. Trump wrote in this article:  
 
“USMC [United States Marine Corps] Sgt. Tahmooressi sacrified for our country, 
and while Obama is welcoming illegals, our Marine is locked in a Mexican jail. 
Mexico is allowing tens of thousands to go through their country and to our very 
stupid ‘open door’ at the Mexican border. Frankly, Sgt. Tahmooressi is the only 
person who can’t come into our country! […] It’s clear to me that a country that 
cannot protect its borders will not last. What about the people at home? We are 
not caring for our own. […] We cannot, as a nation, continue this way. The 
underlying fear now is that Obama has planned it that way. […] The problem is 
easy to solve with leadership. We don’t have leadership in any capable capacity. 
It is a sad time for America” (Trump, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1: Donald Trump promotes a Breitbart-piece he wrote on Twitter  
 
In order to promote his piece, Trump shared a link to it on Twitter (see figure 1). The 
background to this article is that former Marine Corps sergeant Andrew Tahmooressi 
was jailed in Mexico after he illegally crossed the border with three loaded guns in his 
car. All four elements of right-wing authoritarian ideology are present in Trump’s piece: 
• The friend/enemy-scheme: Trump constructs a national conflict between Mexico and 
the USA. Mexico is said to allow illegal immigrants to cross into the USA and to jail 
American soldiers. The channelling of immigrants and the jailing of a former soldier, 
who was put into prison not in his role as soldier, but as a private individual allegedly 
violating Mexican law, are presented as Mexican practices that harm US citizens. 
• Nationalism: Trump constructs a national “we”-identity of US-citizens that is directed 
against Mexico by speaking of “our country”, “our Marine”, “our own” interest, or “we 
as a nation”. Trump presents a us/them-difference, where “we” US-Americans are 
opposed to Mexicans and “their country”.  
• Militarism: Trump speaks of “our Marine” who “is locked in a Mexican jail” in order to 
argue that US-soldiers are individuals of highest honour because they take up arms 
to enforce US interests. Trump in general idolises soldiers and the military. In his 
ideology, the soldier is the ideal type of a human being. Whereas he considers US 
state violence as appropriate, he decries the use of Mexican law against US citizens, 
implying that it is unjust to prosecute US soldiers for breaking Mexican laws. Trump 
fuses militarism with nationalism and racist prejudices in order to create the 
impression that there is a national conflict between Mexico and the USA.  
• Strong leadership: Finally, Trump argues that Illegal immigration and the alleged 
destruction of the US nation (“a country that cannot protect its borders will not last”) 
is due to Obama’s alleged weak leadership (“We don’t have leadership in any 
capable capacity”) and “open door”-policy “at the Mexican border”. Trump implicitly 
suggests that he himself would be a strong leader (“The problem is easy to solve 
with leadership”) and thereby anticipated his own candidacy in the 2016 US 
presidential election.  
 
In order to be effective, ideologies need to be reproduced in the form of a constant flow 
of tabloid news, scandals, revelations, etc. Right-wing forces make use of social media 
for spreading the ideologies of top-down leadership, nationalism, the friend/enemy-
scheme, and militarism/law & order-politics. Social media is a suited medium for 
spreading fake news and far-right propaganda because it is brief and superficial, 
operates at high speed, can reach a vast number of potential users in a short time by 
making postings spread in a networked information space, supports the amplification of 
emotions in the form of “likes” and other emoticons, and appeals to individuals’ interest 
in sensationalism. The tabloid-like structure of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube supports 
the online spread of right-wing ideology. Capitalist social media have tolerated right-
wing propaganda because vast flows of content and data promise higher profits from 
targeted ads. Social media is not the cause of the proletariat’s reified consciousness in 
the contemporary world, but it is one of the communication tools that right-wing 
demagogues employ for spreading their ideologies. The very cause of the rise of the 
far-right is that capitalist politics have backfired and created a negative dialectic, in 
which the freedom of the market has intensified fears and inequalities that express 
themselves in support for far-right ideologies, politicians, movements and parties. Of 
course, also democrats and left-wing activists use social media for trying to challenge 
far-right ideology and communicate different stories and worldviews. But without a 
doubt, right-wing authoritarian ideology has contributed to a sustained reification of the 
proletariat’s consciousness so that the rootedness of social problems in capitalism’s 
very structure is veiled.  
Anti-fascists and anti-racists contest right-wing authoritarianism online. There are not 
just the likes of Breitbart on social media, but also groups and indiviudals such as Hope 
Not Hate (around 100k followers on Twitter), Democratic Socialists of America (around 
250k Twitter-followers), Black Lives Matter (around 350k Twitter-followers), National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (around 450k Twitter-followers), 
etc. that challenge racism and right-wing extremism and run online campaigns. An 
example is the International Day Against Fascism and Antisemitism (9 November) that 
uses hashtags such as #SpeakUpNow, #FightFascism, #9November, 
#DayAgainstFascism, and #DayAgainstAntisemitism. 
The next section will based on HCC discuss the relationship of journalism and 
reification and will relate HCC to digital phenomena such as social media, online fake 
news, targeted advertising, algorithms, and political bots. 
 
3. Journalism and reification 
 
Lukács on journalism 
 
Ideology does not exist independent from human beings, but must be constantly 
produced and reproduced in social relations. Lukács mentions bourgeois journalists as 
producers of ideology. By “bourgeois” journalists, we mean journalists who create 
stories that reify capitalism and domination with the help of various ideological 
strategies. Bourgeois journalism is a particular type of ideological labour, labour that 
creates ideological news stories.  
Lukács argues that physical workers experience reification relatively directly. Their 
labour “directly possesses the naked and abstract form of the commodity, while in other 
forms of work this [reification] is hidden behind the façade of ‘mental labour’, of 
‘responsibility’, etc.” (HCC, p. 172). “The more deeply reification penetrates into the soul 
of the man who sells his achievement as a commodity the more deceptive appearances 
are (as in the case of journalism)” (HCC, p. 172). Journalists’ love of their work and their 
ethos as democracy’s fourth estate that guarantees freedom of expression and opinion 
and tries to make power transparent and tries to prevent the abuse of power, can easily 
veil their status as wage-workers.  
In HCC, Lukács remarks in one passage: “The journalist’s ‘lack of convictions’, the 
prostitution of his experiences and beliefs is comprehensible only as the apogee of 
capitalist reification” (HCC, p. 100). As a result, the news produced by bourgeois 
journalism often reifies capitalism and domination. In a footnote to the passage just 
cited, Lukács (HCC, p. 210, footnote 24) refers to an essay by Béla Fogarasi (without 
mentioning its title). Fogarasi (1891-1959) was like Lukács a member of the Hungarian 
Communist Party. They were both members of the “Sunday Circle”, an intellectual 
discussion group that existed from 1915 until 1918 in Budapest. Fogarasi’s (1921/1983) 
essay “Tasks of the Communist Press”, to which Lukács refers, was published in 1921. 
The essay distinguishes between the capitalist and the communist press and argues 
that the capitalist press is “an ideological weapon in the class struggle” (p. 149) utilised 
by the bourgeoisie in order to dominate “the ideology of the ensemble of classes” (p. 
149). “What the capitalist press seeks is to shape the structure of the reader’s 
consciousness in such a way that he will be perpetually unable to distinguish between 
true and false, to relate causes and effects, to place individual facts in their total context, 
to rationally integrate new knowledge into his perspective” (Fogarasi, 1921/1983, p.  
150). Fogarasi implicitly applies Lukács’ critique of reified consciousness to the 
capitalist press. In the capitalist press, the focus is often not on the dialectic of totality, 
particularity and individuality, but merely on individual, isolated pieces of news. 
According to Fogarasi, strategies of the capitalist press include to report a multitude of 
isolated facts that shall quench the readers’ thirst for knowledge, de-politicisation, and 
sensationalism that work systematically in the service of distraction, and pseudo-
objectivity. In contrast, the communist press tries to advance the consciousness of 
society as totality and of the relation of single events with each other and broader 
contexts, the unmasking of the capitalist press, and the participation of readers as 
producers of reports. 
Fogarasi not just applied Lukács’ concepts of reification and the totality to journalism, 
but also in 1921 anticipated Benjamin’s (1934, p. 777) idea of turning “consumers […] 
into producers” and “readers or spectators into collaborators” as well as Brecht’s (1932, 
p. 42) idea of a radio that lets “the listener speak as well as hear”. Fogarasi’s essay also 
points out aspects of ideology in the media that resonate with Lukács notions of 
ideology and reified consciousness.  
The next two sub-sections will show that Lukács’ analyses of news and journalism as 
reified consciousness remain topical in the contemporary age of the Internet, social 
media, and fake news. 
 
The new spirit of capitalism 
 
In contemporary capitalism, creative workers’ love of the content of their labour and the 
high degree of self-determination has become a new ideology that veils the fact that 
those, who can do what they love, often do so under precarious conditions. Luc 
Boltanski and Ève Chiapello (2005) speak in this context of the “new spirit of 
capitalism”. The new spirit of capitalism is a management ideology that promises to 
workers to conduct labour that features “autonomy, spontaneity, rhizomorphous 
capacity, multitasking (in contrast to the narrow specialization of the old division of 
labour), conviviality, openness to others and novelty, availability, creativity, visionary 
intuition, sensitivity to differences, listening to lived experience and receptiveness to a 
whole range of experiences, being attracted to informality and the search for 
interpersonal contacts” – qualities that “are taken directly from the repertoire of May 
1968” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 97).  
The new spirit of capitalism promises to knowledge workers less alienated labour, by 
which they can live the life of an artist, celebrity, or journalist. A range of studies has 
shown that knowledge workers in media industries see their labour as highly creative, 
self-determined and self-fulfilling, but that it is at the same time often highly precarious5 
Rosalind Gill (2011) summarises the results of such studies by identifying ten features 
of cultural and media labour: Such labour is often characterised by 1) love of the work, 
2) the entrepreneurial aspiration to innovate and pioneer, 3) is often short-term, 
precarious and insecure, 4) is characterised by low pay and 5) long hours, 6) requires 
that workers constantly develop their knowledge and skills, 7) is based on DIY learning 
and 8) informality, 9) features inequalities relating to gender, age, class, race, ethnicity 
and disability, and 10) deprives workers of the time and resources necessary to plan 
their future.  
Cultural and media labour appears to be less reified and alienated than manual 
labour, but is often organised as precarious freelancing that does not provide adequate 
social, job and income security. The ideology of conducting labour that is creative and 
innovative can reify the consciousness of cultural workers so that they do not see 
themselves as workers, but entrepreneurs, are hostile to unionisation, see precarity as 
their individual fault and not a class relation imposed by capitalism, etc. The new spirit 
of capitalism is a new ideology that reifies labour by creating the appearance of de-
alienation and at the same time imposes highly individualised working conditions that 
undermine social and income security. It is a new form of alienation that appears to be 
unalienated. Whether workers’ reaction to this new ideology is reified or non-reified 
consciousness, depends among several factors on the question whether they can be 
collectively politically organised and develop critical consciousness that lets them see 
through the capitalist reality behind the false appearances.  
Especially young precarious workers in the cultural sector have tried to fight back 
against neoliberalism by reinvigorating the cooperative movement. Cultural 
cooperatives are self-managed companies that are collectively owned and governed by 
their workers (see http://cultural.coop/) (Sandoval, 2016). In the realm of the Internet, 
there have been experiments with platform co-operatives (Scholz & Schneider, 2016). 
 
The age of online fake news  
 
Advertising-funded media focus on sensationalism and entertainment in order to attract 
and sell audiences and tend to feature pro-capitalist and conservative worldviews. 
Google, Facebook and Twitter use targeted-advertising, which allows to personalise 
and individualise ads with the help of digital surveillance and big data analytics. The 
Cambridge Analytica scandal has shown how the targeted ad-based model of digital 
capitalism collides with democracy: In 2013, University of Cambridge-neuroscientist 
Aleksandr Kogan began to use Facebook’s developer platform in order to conduct a 
personality quiz. As a result, personal data of around 90 million users was collected and 
sold to Cambridge Analytica, a company whose vice-president was Steve Bannon. 
Cambridge Analytica used the data for targeting users with fake news in election 
campaigns, which has been widely seen as the attempt to manipulate democracy. In the 
light of Cambridge Analytica, critical studies of online fake news and post-truth online 
have proliferated (see e.g. Duffy, Tandoc, & Ling, 2019; Humprecht, 2019; Carlson, 
2020). Facebook has as a consequence come under public scrutiny in 2018 because it 
seems to have known about the use of its targeting mechanism for anti-democratic 
activities. Targeted online advertising allows large corporations to manipulate and 
colonise the public sphere by using their advertising budgets for targeting users with 
corporate and political propaganda. In the online world, native advertising and branded 
content make it difficult to discern advertising from editorial content, which undermines 
journalistic autonomy.  
Selective sourcing that benefits elites and the capitalist class constitutes a news filter. 
Online communication other than mass media is based on a decentralised 
communication infrastructure, where in principle everyone can produce and disseminate 
information. In the online world, the power hierarchy and class structuration shift from 
the production of content to the production of visibility and attention. Corporations, 
celebrities, traditional and new elites dominate online visibility and online attention (see 
Fuchs, 2017, pp. 122-128). For example, in July 2018 Luis Fonsi’s music video 
“Despacito” was with 5 billion and 368 million views the most accessed YouTube-video 
of all times6. Universal Music Latin Entertainment, a division of the Universal Music 
Group that is owned by Vivendi, is the publisher of Fonsi’s song and video, which shows 
that big multimedia corporations play a dominant role on YouTube. Given that corporate 
social media are advertising-based, attention can be purchased as commodity, which 
benefits wealthy corporations and individuals.   
Fake news is as old as the tabloid press, but in the online world fake news can 
spread quickly, can be individually targeted, and it is often hard to distinguish if online 
behaviour in the context of fake news is conducted by humans or algorithms. Right-wing 
movements try to make use of social media for spreading their propaganda and 
challenging socialist and liberal political positions and worldviews online. They not just 
use bots and traditional lobbying methods online, but often also resort to threats, 
bullying and hate speech. 
Bourgeois media often, but not exclusively spread ideology. In section three, we have 
already seen an example of how nationalist and xenophobic ideology is spread online. 
Ideology on the Internet tends to be visual and tabloidised. It makes use of strategies 
such as simplification, the use of only few words, emotionalisation, scandalisation, 
polarisation, banalisation, manipulation, fabrication, etc. User-generated ideology 
means that the labour of producing ideology is not confined to professional ideologues, 
but has penetrated everyday life. Ideologies are sensational, populist, simplistic, 
emotional, and directly address particular groups. Algorithms amplify the views of those 
who gain high levels of attention. As a consequence, we find the online tendency of the 
algorithmic amplification of online ideologies. 
The actions of corporations, celebrities, and political elites result in the colonisation of 
the public sphere. These processes also operate in the online world and on social 
media, where targeted advertising, algorithms, big data, political bots, fake online news, 
digital surveillance and other mechanisms are used and result in the corporate and 
political stratification of the Internet.  
Fake news has been challenged by developments such as fact-checking 
organisations and the quest for building a public service Internet that consists of non-
commercial platforms that do not have a for-profit imperative but want to benefit the 
public by reliable news, information and educational resources that are provided online 
and engage users (Fuchs, 2018). 
In the next section, we will see that communication technologies are not just a 
medium for the communication and challenging of reified thought, but also form an 
object of reification. Lukács’ work will be used for showing how one can analyse 
ideologies of the Internet and digital media.  
 
4. The reification of communication technologies  
 
Lukács on intellectual workers 
 
In the essay “Intellectual Workers” and the Problem of Intellectual Leadership, written in 
1919, Lukács (2014, pp. 12-18) argues that intellectual workers do not form a separate 
class. Those “who, like manual workers, are able to participate in production only by 
means of their labour power (white-collar workers, engineers, etc.)” differ “sharply from 
those whose intellectual work is only an accessory to their bourgeois status (major 
share-holders, factory owners). The class distinction between these two groups is so 
clear to the objective observer that it is impossible to bring them together under one 
heading, as the class of ‘intellectual workers’” (Lukács, 2014, p. 12). “Those ‘intellectual 
workers’ who participate in production therefore belong (with an unclear class 
consciousness, at best) to the same class as the manual workers” (Lukács, 2014, p. 
13). Intellectual workers are not “a homogeneously structured class, since even within 
their ranks a clear division into oppressors and oppressed” (Lukács, 2014, p. 13) can be 
found. 
 
Knowledge workers in the information society 
 
In discussions of the “information society” (Webster, 2014), a distinction among the 
agricultural sector, the manufacturing sector, and the service sector is frequently made. 
As part of this division, information and knowledge workers are often said to form a 
distinct group within the service sector. The problem of this argument is, as Lukács 
indicates, that managers who sustain the control of workers and represent the capitalist 
interest are said to share the same position in the production process as productive 
knowledge workers, who directly create commodities that are sold in order to yield 
profit.  
Today, the class character of knowledge workers has become even more complex 
because many creative workers have the status of freelancers: They sell their labour via 
one-time contracts and do not have the capital necessary to employ others. Freelancing 
is especially prevalent among knowledge workers such as data inputters, software and 
web developers, designers, translators, writers, personal assistants, editors, and proof-
readers. Such workers sell their labour power and yield profit for others. As long as a 
freelancer does not form a business that besides him- or herself also employs others, 
there is no doubt that s/he is part of the working class. Journalists are either wage-
workers or, increasingly, freelancers. Their position in the production process on the 
one hand makes them part of the working class. But journalists, consultants and others 
who serve, as Lukács writes, “material, ideological and power interests” (Lukács, 2014, 
p. 13) by justifying capitalist interests in their writings, are just like managers part of the 
ruling class. Only the critical journalists, who investigates capitalism critically, is fully 
part of the working class and not part of the ruling class.  
Fake news has been challenged by developments such as fact-checking 
organisations and the quest for building a public service Internet that consists of non-
commercial platforms that do not have a for-profit imperative but want to benefit the 
public by reliable news, information and educational resources that are provided online 
and engage users (Fuchs, 2018). 
 
Lukács’ critique of technological fetishism in the age of big data capitalism 
 
There are not just ideologies that are communicated with the help of technologies, but 
also ideologies of technologies. In respect to digital technologies, we do not just find 
ideologies on the Internet, but also ideologies of the Internet. Lukács does not use the 
term “technological fetishism”, but describes how technologies are turned into fetish 
objects. He speaks of “the exploitation for particular human ends (as in technology, for 
example) of […] fatalistically accepted and immutable laws” (HCC, p. 38). Technological 
fetishism distorts the machine’s “true objective nature by representing its function in the 
capitalist production process as its ‘eternal’ essence” (HCC, p. 153). 
In the age of digital capitalism, digital technologies such as the Internet, social media 
platforms, the mobile phone, big data technologies, the Internet of Things, cloud 
computing, industry 4.0/industrial Internet, etc. are often treated as technological 
fetishes in bourgeois thought. Let us consider an example. The business press is in 
general a good source for observing the newest trends in bourgeois ideology.  
In May 2017, The Economist ran a cover story under the title “The World’s Most 
Valuable Resource is no Longer Oil, but Data”: “A NEW commodity spawns a lucrative, 
fast-growing industry. […] A century ago, the resource in question was oil. Now similar 
concerns are being raised by the giants that deal in data, the oil of the digital era” (The 
Economist, 2017). Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft are “titans” that 
“look unstoppable”. “The giants’ success has benefited consumers. Few want to live 
without Google’s search engine, Amazon’s one-day delivery or Facebook’s newsfeed”. 
“Algorithms can predict when a customer is ready to buy, a jet-engine needs servicing 
or a person is at risk of a disease”. Fortune published an interview on big data with 
Intel’s CEO Brian Krzanich. He said: “Oil changed the world in the 1900s. It drove cars, 
it drove the whole chemical industry. […] Data, I look at it as the new oil. It’s going to 
change most industries across the board” (Gharib, 2018). Artificial Intelligence-based 
data is “not just gonna change business, it’s gonna change every person on this 
planet’s life in some positive way”. “I think if you go and talk to the employees, they’ve 
never seen the company on this level of pace of change and competitiveness. But I 
don’t think you can ever stand still and say that it’s fast enough in this technology 
world”.  
 
These examples show some typical features of technological fetishism: 
• Autonomy: Technology is presented as being autonomous from society’s power 
structures. Technology is not situated in society as totality. In the two examples, 
there is predominantly a focus on how new technologies such as big data 
technologies and Artificial Intelligence positively change society without a focus on 
how they are embedded into class structures, exploitation, and domination. 
• Subjectivity: Technology and not humans are presented as a subject that acts (“Oil 
changes”, etc., Data is “going to change most industries”, AI “changes every person 
on this planet’s life”). The purpose of this strategy is to reify technological 
developments as inevitable, unchangeable, unavoidable and irreversible by 
presenting them as independent from human will and action.  
• Revolution: Technological developments are presented as revolutionary, as taking 
place rapidly and as changing everything (“Data” as the “new oil”, “data, the oil of the 
digital era”, “this level of pace of change” is never “fast enough in this technology 
world”). The goal of this strategy of presentation is that humans do not question 
undoing certain technologies or aspects of them. 
• Technology as one-dimensional cause, digital determinism: Technology is said to be 
the cause of changes in society (“it’s gonna change every person on this planet’s life 
in some positive way”). Power structures and social contradictions are disregarded.  
• Technological optimism/pessimism: Changes in society that stand in the context of 
technology are said to be either purely positive (technological optimism) or purely 
negative (technological pessimism). In the examples, it is for example claimed that 
big data “has benefited consumers. Few want to live without” it. Or that algorithms 
can predict when a person is “at risk of a disease” and “change every person’s […] 
life in some positive way”. There is no talk about actual or potential harms such as 
algorithmic surveillance, algorithmic discrimination, disadvantages arising from 
errors and false predictions, etc. 
 
Lukács’ critique of quantification 
 
In HCC, Lukács develops a critique of the logic of quantification that he sees at the 
heart of reified thought and bourgeois consciousness. It lies in the “nature of capitalism 
to” reduce “the phenomena to their purely quantitative essence, to their expression in 
numbers and numerical relations” (HCC, p. 6). Capitalism uses the sciences in order to 
assess and optimise investments, labour-time, capital accumulation, commodities, 
power, etc. Capitalism is the society of accumulation that is based on the logic of 
capital, which is transferred into different realms of society, such as politics and culture, 
in order to accumulate not just money, but also decision-power and definition-power. In 
order to accumulate, you need to assess existing quantities as foundation for identifying 
strategies of how to increase them. At the end of the process, the result is quantified in 
order to identify strategies of what to do when the accumulation process starts all over 
again. Capitalism has to develop ever newer forms of rationalisation and new methods 
of production in order to increase productivity, reduce costs and accumulate capital. The 
history of capitalist technology is therefore a history of rationalisation and the 
development of ever newer methods of quantification. “If we follow the path taken by 
labour in its development from the handicrafts via co-operation and manufacture to 
machine industry we can see a continuous trend towards greater rationalisation, the 
progressive elimination of the qualitative, human and individual attributes of the worker” 
(HCC, p. 88). Modern philosophy has developed together with technologies of 
rationalisation (HCC, p. 113). Lukács argues that reification’s reduction of totalities to 
partialities is not limited to the economy, but also affects bureaucracy, the state, the law, 
and culture (HCC, pp. 98-100). 
The logic of computing is reductionist and anti-dialectical: “The methodology of the 
natural sciences which forms the methodological ideal of every fetishistic science and 
every kind of Revisionism reject the idea of contradiction and antagonism in its subject 
matter” (HCC: 10). Mathematical logic cannot see “the whole system at once” (HCC, p. 
117). It reduces explanations to basic principles (reductionism) and believes in the exact 
predictability and calculability of the world (determinism) (HCC, p. 117). Lukács (HCC, 
pp. 89-90) quotes Marx in order to show capitalism’s fetishism of quantification: “Time is 
everything, man is nothing; he is, at the most, time's carcase. Quality no longer matters. 
Quantity alone decides everything; hour for hour, day for day” (Marx, 1847, p. 127). 
Lukács writes: “Thus time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into 
an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable ‘things’ (the reified, 
mechanically objectified ‘performance’ of the worker, whole separated from his total 
human personality)” (HCC, p. 90). In the essay The Question of Educational Work (first 
published in 1921), Lukács (2014, pp. 91-92) argues that the bourgeois belief in the 
power of quantification and the natural sciences was reflected in the mechanical 
determinism advanced by both bourgeois economics and revisionist social democracy. 
Critical thought, in contrast, has to do “away completely with all forms of fatalism” 
(Lukács, 2014, p. 93). It stresses human qualities such as the capacity of humans to 
change the world. 
Freelancers not just face a peculiar form of exploitation, but have also self-organised 
in order to resist precarity. As a result, unions such as the Freelancer’s Union and the 
Independent Workers’ Union (IWGB) have been created that put an emphasis on being 
platforms for self-organised struggles of freelancers and other non-traditional workers. 
 
Lukács’ critique of quantification revisited: the critique of big data analytics 
 
Big data analytics is the newest methodological trend of quantification in almost all 
academic fields. It is a method that gathers large amounts of data and applies 
algorithms and mathematical analysis (such as correlation analysis) to this data in order 
to identify patterns, relations, correlations and predict behaviour that allow “to monitor, 
manage, and control citizens” (Mosco, 2017, p. 8). As a reaction to the rise of big data, 
a series of critical studies of big data analytics and its implications for society has 
emerged (see e.g. Andrejevic, 2014; Beer, 2018; boyd & Crawford, 2012; Couldry & 
Mejias, 2019; Chandler & Fuchs, 2019; Van Dijck, Poell, & de Waal, 2018).  
Big data analytics’ fetishism of quantification has led uncritical tech enthusiasts such 
as the former editor of the neoliberal Wired magazine Chris Anderson (2008) to argue 
that big data results in the “end of theory”: “With enough data, the numbers speak for 
themselves […] [When] faced with massive data, this [traditional] approach to science – 
hypothesize, model, test – is becoming obsolete. […]”. 
Big data positivism’s quantitative methodology disregards the qualitative aspects of 
the analysis of society, such as ethics, morals, critique, theory, emotions, affects, 
motivations, worldviews, interpretations, political assessments, power, social struggles, 
or contradictions. The danger is that big data analytics advances uncritical, instrumental 
knowledge that serves dominant interests in the execution of capitalist rule and 
domination. Another danger of big data analytics is that the social sciences and 
humanities are colonised by a combination of computer science and business studies 
that tries to root out critical thinking and critical theory by instrumental big data reason. 
Big data analytics is one of the newest developments in the history of tools of reification 
that Lukács analyses and criticises.  
Chen, Chiang and Storey’s (2012) article  is one of the most cited articles that contain 
“big data” in the title7. The authors identify big data analytics as “business intelligence 
and analytics (BI&A) 3.0” that follows after the two stages of BI&A 1.0 (statistical 
analysis and data mining applied to structured data collected through enterprise 
systems) and BI&A 2.0 (text and web analytics applied to unstructured web contents). 
“[B]ig data and big data analytics have been used to describe the data sets and 
analytical techniques in applications that are so large (from terabytes to exabytes) and 
complex (from sensor to social media data) that they require advanced and unique data 
storage, management, analysis, and visualization technologies” (Chen, Chiang and 
Storey, 2012: 1166). The authors argue that big data analytics will have “big impact” 
(Chen, Chiang & Storey, 2012, p. 1168) on society. They list purely positive impacts in 
the realms of the economy, politics, science and technology, health and wellbeing, and 
security and public safety that include “increased sale and customer satisfaction”, the 
improvement of “transparency, participation, and equality”, increased “scientific impact”, 
“[i]mproved healthcare quality”, and “[i]mproved public safety and security”. Chen, 
Chiang and Story’s article is typical for mainstream research on big data: It is the 
expression of highly reified thought that argues that pure quantification as represented 
by big data analytics will radically transform society and only have positive impacts that 
will improve life in society in many respects. Possible negative consequences are not 
analysed and discussed, which is the consequence of the abstraction of the analysis 
from society as totality and its social relations of power.  
Big data analytics tends to forget about class and domination. Its fetishism of 
quantification sees society as a thing constituted by large quantities of data and 
disregards the social qualities that make up society. Big data analytics is what Lukács 
describes as a “fetishistic science” that disregards “contradiction and antagonism” 
(HCC: 10) and the totality. 
Big data analytics is certainly a major trend in research and academia. Its digital 
positivism has, however, been challenged by approaches such as critical digital and 
social media studies, critical digital sociology, and critical digital humanities (Fuchs, 




We can summarise this essay’s key results: 
• In HCC, Lukács conceives of society based on a dialectic of subject and object that 
avoids the pitfalls of voluntarist spontaneism and mechanist fatalism. In later works, 
he clarified the mediating role of language and communication in the dialectic of 
subject and object: Communication is the mediating process in the dialectic of 
subject of object that produces and reproduces social relations. There is a dialectic 
of work and communication (communication at work, the work of communication).  
• Lukács shows in HCC that the reification of consciousness has objective foundations 
in capitalism’s commodity structures and forms an element of ideologies that justify 
capitalism by naturalising structures and practices of domination. In contemporary 
capitalism, social media have become a medium of communication, where reified 
thought is communicated and challenged. Especially the communication of right-
wing authoritarian ideologies and its elements of strong leadership, nationalism, the 
friend-enemy-schema and militarism is prevalent on corporate social media such as 
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube.  
• Cultural and media labour constitutes a new form of reification: By fostering creativity 
and self-determined labour, it appears as and creates an aura of non-alienated 
labour that deflects attention from the fact that such labour is often highly insecure 
and precarious. 
• Private ownership/profit-orientation, advertising, and ideology operate in new ways 
in the realm of social media and on the Internet, which results in the colonisation of 
the online public sphere by the interests of corporations, celebrities, and political 
elites.   
• Lukács’ critique of reification entails a critique of technological fetishism and the logic 
of quantification. In digital capitalism, this analysis matters in several respects, 
including the critique of digital determinism and digital positivism.  
• Digital determinism fetishises digital technologies by presenting them as 
autonomous subjects that bring about revolutionary technological changes of society 
that are either purely positive or purely negative. 
• Big data analytics is one of the newest developments in the history of tools of 
reification that Lukács analyses and criticises. Big data analytics is a form of digital 
positivism and fetishistic science that disregards qualities, contradictions and 
totalities. It advances uncritical, instrumental knowledge that serves dominant 
interests by being used as a tool of reification.  
 
History and Class Consciousness’ critique of reification, ideology and reified 
consciousness remains highly topical in the age of digital capitalism and big data. 
Lukács’ analysis allows us to critically analyse how social media, big data and various 
other Internet technologies are used as tools of reification. That new technologies are 
deeply embedded into capitalist and dominative structures does however not imply that 
there are no alternative potentials and no alternative forces at work in the realm of 
digital technologies. Lukács opposed deterministic analyses, which implies that 
although exploitation and domination are ubiquitous in capitalism, there is always the 
possibility for critical consciousness and critical action (praxis). 
In reified computing and technology, the instrumental logic of quantification, capital 
and bureaucracy subsumes human activities and destroys solidarity. At the same time, 
modern technology has created new potentials for co-operation and socialisation. 
Computing operates at different levels. A socialist framework of society and technology 
does not need to abolish computing, but needs to transform its design so that 
technologies are human-centred, humans in collective processes control the design and 
use of technology, and quantification is subsumed under the logic of human-
centredness. For example, socialist design does not mean to abolish social media, but 
to make them truly social so that privacy violations, intransparent algorithms, targeted 
advertising, individualism, and the accumulation of reputation are no longer design 
principles and are substituted by privacy-friendliness, direct human communication, 
collective production, co-operation, solidarity, creative commons and transparency and 
the openness of algorithms as design principles.  
Digital technologies such as the Internet are today also used by activists for 
challenging exploitation and domination (Fuchs, 2014). Digital commons projects such 
as Wikipedia and alternative online media (e.g. Democracy Now! and Alternet) 
challenge the capitalist shaping of digital technologies. Furthermore, there are potentials 
for public service Internet platforms and platform co-operatives that challenge the logic 
of the corporate digital giants (Fuchs, 2018b). These are attempts to create a non-
reified, commons-based and public and commons-based digital media landscape. One 
crucial lesson we can learn from Lukács is that revolutionising the digital media 
landscape so that the capitalist Internet can be transcended towards a commons-based 
Internet can neither be achieved by technology nor by single individuals, but only by 
critically conscious humans who organise themselves as political collectives and 
engage in class struggles that transform technology and society. Only human praxis can 
create a commons-based Internet and a socialist society.  
Lukács stresses that the creation of workers’ councils is a form of class struggle that 
“spells the political and economic defeat of reification” (HCC, 80). In the digital age, 
where users are producers and there is a variety of digital workers, the creation of 
platform co-operatives that are owned by workers and users as well as public service 
Internet platforms that are publicly owned are part of the struggle of the working class 
against digital capital’s power. In addition, we today find the use of social media and 
apps as communicative weapons in social struggles. Examples are the use of social 
media in various Occupy movements (Author, 2014) and in the Chinese working class’ 
struggles against corporations such as Foxconn (Qiu, 2016). Another important realm of 
class struggle in digital capitalism are the demands of gig economy workers for better 
working conditions that are voiced with the help of the Internet (see e.g. Cant, 2020; 
Ravenelle, 2019; Woodcock, 2019). Digital media today are not just tools of reification, 
but also tools of class struggles by which the contemporary digital proletariat has the 
opportunity to perfect “itself by annihilating and transcending itself, by creating the 
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5 For an overview see the contributions in Maxwell (2016).   
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7 ISI Web of Knowledge: search conducted on July 29, 2018: With 863 citations, the 
article was the second most cited work containing ‘big data’ in the title.   
                                               
